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USING THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO
PROTECT THE "IDEAS" THAT MAKE THE MOVIES
Kerry Ryan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the movie industry, screenwriters are currently unable to
protect their ideas, circulated as screenplays, from wrongful appro-
priation by producers and studios. This trend may lead to a reduc-
tion in the number of screenplays disseminated and an eventual loss
of the creative input which serves as the skeleton for all motion pic-
tures. Consistent judicial application of contract protection for
screenwriters and their screenplays would avoid this result. The
courts have indicated their willingness to give contract protection, but
have continued to use antiquated theories which fail to significantly
help the screenwriter. This article proposes the use of modern con-
tract theory, as embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code, as the
means of offering equitable and consistent protection to screenwriters
and their screenplays.
II. THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE PROTECTION
A copyright protects only the expression of an idea and not the
idea itself.' As the 1976 Copyright Act specifically provides, "f[in no
case does copyright protection . . . extend to any idea . . . concept,
principle or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied .. "2 This underlying princi-
ple is based on an unwillingness to grant a monopoly in ideas to one
author' and assures that ideas remain in the public domain, free for
all members of society to use.' However, this policy has also func-
* Mr. Ryan is an associate with Clark & Trevithick, Los Angeles, California. J.D.,
1987, University of Florida; B.S., 1981, Indiana University. The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Professor Jerome H. Reichman, currently at Vanderbilt University, for his
advice and encouragement during his stay as a visiting professor at the Univesity of Florida.
1. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game
Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
3. See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 16.01 (1986) [hereinafter 3 M.
NIMMER].
4. Id.
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tioned to deny protection to screenwriters. Only the completed movie
will actually be the true expression of the idea and protected by
copyright. The screenplay, although usually copyrighted, remains
unprotected.5
Recently, a number of cases have demonstrated the high risk of
misappropriation that screenwriters are subject to under the present
copyright law. In Midas Productions Inc. v. Baer,' for example,
Max Baer took a script from a failed movie project and shortly
thereafter "conceived" of a movie that had many similarities to the
original script.' The owners of the original script then brought a
copyright infringement suit against Baer.8
The plaintiff's expert witness testified that there was "substan-
tial similarity as to plot, characters, setting and theme."9 The wit-
ness gave seven specific examples of plot similarity1" along with
three examples of common scenes." Yet, the Midas court refused to
protect what it termed "the borrowing of abstract ideas contained in
the copyrighted work."1 2 Similarly, in Smith v. Weinstein," Ms.
Weinstein reviewed several of Smith's scripts centering around a
prison rodeo concept. Ms. Weinstein, a producer, discussed Smith's
concept with Columbia Pictures." Columbia then hired another
writer to write the movie "Stir Crazy," which involved a prison ro-
deo concept similar to that of Smith's. Smith brought a copyright
5. See infra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
6. 437 F. Supp. 1388 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
7. Id. at 1389.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 1. Three young people travel through The South. 2. While stopped at a
service station, they are warned by a lawman to 'keep moving.' 3. Their vehicle
becomes stranded after a breakdown. 4. They camp out. 5. A murder occurs,
and circumstantial evidence suggests the trio to be guilty of the murder. 6. The
trio is pursued. 7. One of the young people in [plaintiff's script] is murdered,
and two of them in [defendant's movie] are murdered.
Id. at 1389.
11. Id. The witness testified:
In each script there was a romantic involvement between a female hitchhiker
who joined them and one of the group, and that this relationship included a
scene of nude frolicking in the water .... [Both] had a scene in a service sta-
tion in which the service station operator's wife was depicted as a fat, course,
country woman. Additionally, there was a scene common to both that took place
in a diner in which the young travelers ripped off the cafe owner.
Id.
12. 437 F. Supp. at 1390.
13. 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984).
14. Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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infringement claim16 against Weinstein and Columbia Pictures. The
court stated: "[S]ome similarities exist, but at a level of expression
either too general or too insignificant to be protectable."' Thus, in
both Midas and Weinstein the courts refused to give the original
authors protection even though the later copyrighted scripts were ap-
parently based on their original ideas."7 This willingness by courts to
classify the unauthorized use of original screenplays as the mere bor-
rowing of uncopyrightable ideas has led screenwriters to search for
other theories to protect their ideas.
The theories under which screenwriters have attempted to pro-
tect their ideas include trademark law, 8 misappropriation, 9 quasi-
contract," and breach of confidence. 2 However, each of these theo-
ries has proved inadequate for consistent protection of their ideas.
15. Smith also alleged unfair competition, breach of express and implied contract and
breach of a confidential relationship. Id. at 1299. The court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment concerning the copyright and unfair competition claims. The court dis-
missed the contract and confidential relationship claims without prejudice to later assertion in
state court. Id. at 1308.
16. Id. at 1302.
17. See also Miller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (re-
jecting copyright and unfair competition claims and allowing quasi-contract recovery).
18. Walker v. Time Life Films, 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 784 F.2d 44
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2278 (1986).
19. See Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods. Inc., 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980),
involving the alleged misappropriation of the idea of the film entitled "[t]he Trial of Lee Har-
vey Oswald." The court held that "under certain circumstances, the practice of screening mov-
ies can support a jury's finding of 'confidential relationship.' " Id. at 395. The court looked to
the custom of screening in the movie industry as a justification for finding a confidential rela-
tionship. Id. The court's use of custom as a basis for confidentiality could be analogized to the
custom of reviewing screenplays by the movie industry. Under the reasoning of Capital Films,
this custom could serve as the basis for a confidential relation between the screenwriter and the
producer. Thus, under misappropriation theory a screenwriter could protect his basic ideas
submitted to a producer. But see Walker, 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding misap-
propriation claims are preempted by The Federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976)).
20. See Werlin, 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In allowing a quasi-contract claim,
the court stated, "where the defendant has benefited from its use of an idea generated by the
plaintiff, a court will allow recovery in quasi-contract if the circumstances make it inequitable
for the defendant to profit from the use of plaintiff's idea or material." Id. at 465. But see
Mann v. Columbia Pictures, 128 Cal. App. 3d 628, 634, 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 526 (1982) (not
allowing a quasi-contract claim for use of mere "ideas").
21. See Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1979). In recognition
of the breach of confidence doctrine the court stated:
an actionable breach of confidence will arise when an idea, whether or not pro-
tectable, is offered to another in confidence, and is voluntarily received by the
offeree in confidence with the understanding that it is not to be disclosed to
others, and is not to be used by the offeree for purposes beyond the limits of the
confidence without the offeror's permission.
Id. at 323, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
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Trademark law is usually inapplicable to the screenwriter's claim of
idea appropriation.22 Misappropriation has become an uncertain
doctrine because of its possible preemption under the 1976 Copy-
right Act."3 The willingness of courts to extend quasi-contract theory
beyond its traditional moorings is uncertain at best,"' and may not be
advisable given the more refined doctrinal tools available in modern
contract law. Lastly, breach of confidence is a relatively new doctrine
whose contours of protection are not yet known.25 Thus, the compo-
nents of intellectual property law have failed to protect the screen-
writer who believes himself to be the victim of misappropriation.
III. THE LIMITS OF TRADITIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
Contract law is the one doctrine which has consistently pro-
tected screenwriter's projects. 26 As the Smith court stated, "[flights
under [a contract] agreement are qualitatively different from copy-
right claims, and their recognition creates no monopoly in the ideas
22. In Walker, 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the plaintiff alleged a claim under
section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act (commonly referred to as section 43(a)), which prohibits
false designation of origin or title. Id. at 439.
The plaintiff wrote a book entitled FORT APACHE and defendants released a motion pic-
ture entitled "Fort Apache, the Bronx." d. at 433. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants
stole his ideas from his then unpublished book. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim be-
cause of a lack of public confusion. Id. at 440. The court entered their ruling despite the
plaintiff's offer of three newspaper articles which credited plaintiff as the author of both the
book and the film. Id.
Walker illustrates the difficulty involved in proving "likelihood of confusion" necessary
for a section 43(a) claim. In the usual screenwriter case, it would be unlikely that the original
author could prove that the public believes him to be the author of the completed motion
picture. More likely, the public would simply not realize that the original author existed.
Thus, a section 43(a) claim would seem inapplicable to the usual screenwriter-producer mis-
appropriation lawsuit.
23. Walker, 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding misappropriation is preempted
by section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act). See also Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons,
Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
24. Mann, 128 Cal. App. 3d 628, 180 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1962) (not allowing a quasi-
contract claim for use of mere "ideas").
25. Smith, 578 F. Supp. at 1306. See also Rokos v. Peck, 182 Cal. App. 3d 604, 227
Cal. Rptr. 480 (1986) The court stated: "We must respectfully point out that our colleagues
have not been too precise in describing the nature of the cause of action." Id. at 618, 227 Cal.
Rptr. at 489.
26. See, e.g., Landsberg, 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985); Smith, 578 F. Supp. 1297
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Miller, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA), 502 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Mann, 128 Cal. App.
3d 628 (1982); Faris, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1979); Fink v. Goodson-
Todman Enterprises Ltd., 9 Cal. App. 3d 996, 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970); Davies v. Krasna,
245 Cal. App. 2d 535, 54 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1966). See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, at §§
16.04, 16.05.
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involved."2 7 To the extent that contract law is available, its effective-
ness depends on the ability and willingness of the courts to apply the
supple principles of article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and
the recent Second Restatement of Contracts, to the fact patterns
found in the screenwriter cases. Judicial recognition will depend, in
turn, upon the willingness of the courts to break from traditional
contract theory and accept emerging contract principles. 8 Courts
have hesitated to do this, and no workable legal guidelines have been
established.
A. Express Contract
Referring to traditional contract theory, Professor Nimmer
stated, "under the prevailing view an enforceable express contract
arises if the person to whom an idea is submitted . . . has expressly
promised to pay for it in the event of its use." 9 If an express con-
tract is found between the writer and producer, the writer should
prevail against the producer for any idea appropriated. The courts
do not require that an idea be novel in order to be the subject of a
contract, 80 nor do they view express contract theory as interfering
with the policy of unrestrained circulation of ideas. "This is because
a contract creates no monopoly; it is effective only between the con-
tracting parties; it does not withdraw the idea from general circula-
tion or place a restraint on progress in art."'" Express contracts
could therefore adequately protect screenwriters, if they had the bar-
gaining power to demand them.
Unfortunately, due to the small number of major movie studios,
there are only a limited number of buyers for a screenplay. A large
number of writers and other creative people wish to sell ideas to
these limited buyers. 2 Thus, the typical "writer dealing with a ma-
jor independent producer does not do so on an equal footing."33 Be-
cause of their greater bargaining power, buyers of screenplays will
27. 578 F. Supp. at 1307. judicial recognition of contract claims as a distinct entity
from copyright law would preclude any preemption problems under section 301 of th ' 1976
Copyright Act.
28. Conversations with Professor Jerome H. Reichman, at the University of Florida
(Spring 1986).
29. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 16.04, at 16, 17.
30. Fink, 9 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
31. Id. at 1008, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
32. Note, Remedies for Misappropriation of Motion Picture and Television Story
Ideas, 7 COMM. ENT. L.J. 85, 87 (1984).
33. Id. at 102.
1987]
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rarely "expressly" agree to anything. 84 Express contract theory is
therefore of little practical value. 5
B. Implied Contract
An implied contract is very similar to an express contract except
that the consent of the parties is shown by conduct rather than
words. 8 The elements of an implied-in-fact contract are that: (1) the
writer prepared the work; (2) the writer disclosed the work to a
buyer for sale; (3) under all circumstances attending disclosure, it
can be concluded that the buyer voluntarily accepted the disclosure
knowing the conditions on which it was offered (i.e., the buyer must
have the opportunity to reject the attempted disclosure if the condi-
tions are unacceptable); and (4) the writer must show the reasonable
value of the work.8
7
In applying the implied contract doctrine, some courts have
inappropriately infused copyright concepts into their analysis. 8 One
court extensively discussed "access" and implied that the defendant
must "substantially" base his movie on plaintiff's ideas. 9 The copy-
right concerns of access and substantial similarity should not be in-
discriminately grafted onto contract law'0 since the doctrines are
"qualitatively different."" Instead, the elements of an implied con-
tract should remain anchored in contract law. The elements of an
implied contract, stated above, are more easily understood in contract
34. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text discussing release forms which indi-
cate the studios' express disclaimer that any agreements have taken place.
35. See Note, supra note 32, at 103.
36. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 16.05, at 16-30.
37. Klekas v. EMI Films, Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1114, 198 Cal. Rptr. 296, 304
(1984); Faris, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 318, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
38. Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring "access" and "some
substantial similarity" to recover under an implied-in-fact contract); Mann, 128 Cal. App. 3d
at 635, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
39. Mann, 128 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
40. Cf Whitfield v. Lear, 582 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (lower court's opinion).
The case involved the alleged appropriation of a television format. Id. at 1187. One of plain-
tiff's claims was that the defendant had breached an implied contract. Id. at 1191. The defend-
ant argued that the cause of action should be dismissed because the format and the defendant's
series were not "substantially similar." Id. at 1188. The court stated that, "defendants may be
overstating their case, however, in their assumption that the copyright requirement of 'substan-
tial similarity' is applicable here." Id. at 1191. But on appeal, the court appeared to accept the
defendant's infusion of copyright principles into the case when it stated, "to support recovery
on an implied-in-fact contract [the plaintiff] must show not only access but also that the [de-
fendants] actually used his ideas by demonstrating 'some substantial similarity' between the
ideas and themes of the two programs." Id. at 1193-94.
41. Smith, 578 F. Supp. at 1307.
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terms. The requirement that "the writer disclosed .. for sale" is
merely the contract element of "offer." Likewise, the rest of the ele-
ments seem to actually require "acceptance," "terms" upon which
the contract is based, and a "remedy."
C. Old vs. New Contract Law
The courts' acceptance of contract law in screenwriter-producer
appropriation suits can afford protection for the screenwriter's
projects. However, the law of contracts has changed in recent years,
and the courts have not fully recognized its development. The Second
Restatement of Contracts was adopted in 1979. The Restatement ob-
viates the need to differentiate between express and implied contracts
by stating that "[t]he distinction involves . . . no difference in legal
effect .... ,,4' The Restatement thus approves and extends the prin-
ciple as established by article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code4
enacted in most states during the 1970's.4 Continued judicial resort
to pre-1970's doctrines45 and theories reflects an attachment to "old"
contract law analysis. The courts should instead look to the "new"
contract law, as embodied in the Second Restatement and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, when evaluating screenwriter contract
claims.
IV. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE SECOND
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
A. Purposes
The Uniform Commercial Code 4  was enacted "to simplify,
clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions. 47
Additionally, the UCC was "to permit the continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties," '48 and "to make uniform the law among the various juris-
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4, comment a (1981).
43. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1978).
44. The Uniform Commercial Code has been enacted in all states (except Louisiana),
the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE COMMERCIAL CODE 1 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHITE & SUMMERS].
45. See, e.g., Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 490; Mann, 128 Cal. App. 3d 628 (1982), 180
Cal. Rptr. 522; Faris, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1979); Fink, 9 Cal. App. 3d
996, 80 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970); see also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, §§ 16.04, 16.05; Note,
supra note 32, at 99-104.
46. [hereinafter the UCCI.
47. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1978).
48. Id. at § 1-102(2)(b).
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dictions."' These goals address the problems inherent in current
contract analysis of screenwriter idea misappropriation claims. As
previously discussed, courts have not dealt with this form of idea
protection in any simple, clear or modern manner.50 Because screen-
writers are involved in the commercial practice of selling ideas, their
contractual relationship should be treated consistently throughout the
various jurisdictions.5" The UCC provides a framework for bringing
simple, reasonable and consistent results to the contract problems
faced by screenwriters.
The First Restatement of Contracts was intended to be a com-
pilation of the law of contracts.52 It was "a legendary success, exer-
cising enormous influence as an authoritative exposition of the sub-
ject. ' '53 The Second Restatement of Contracts updates the original
Restatement." The Second Restatement, like the First, should
strongly influence the law of contracts. Thus, the courts should look
to the Second Restatement for guidance in evaluating screenwriter
idea appropriation claims. The Second Restatement, in its substan-
tive aspects, closely parallels the UCC."5
B. Application6
Since article 2 of the UCC applies to "transactions in goods,"57
it must be determined whether screenplays are "goods" and, if so,
whether the dealings between a writer and a studio or producer are
"transactions" within the meaning of section 2-102. No court has
directly held that screenplays are goods, although the question is ac-
knowledged in at least two cases.5" Since there is no judicial decision
49. Id. at § 1-102(2)(c).
50. See supra notes 19-25, 38-45 and accompanying text.
51. For examples of the lack of consistency see supra notes 22-25, 38-40 and accompa-
nying text.
52. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 13 (3d ed. 1987). How-
ever, it must be remembered that the Restatement was issued by a private organization (the
American Law Institute) and thus does not have the force of law. Id.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Forward (1981). See also MURRAY,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 3 (1974); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 52, at 13.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Forward (1981).
55. See MURRAY, supra note 53, at § 3. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, Introduction (1981).
56. For purposes of this paper, the UCC will be primarily discussed and the Second
Restatement will only be discussed or cited when relevant.
57. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978).
58. Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 40 Cal. 2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953). In
Sawyer v. Sickinger, 47 A.D.2d 291, 366 N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), while discuss-
ing a contract for a screenplay and movie option rights, the court stated, "it is unnecessary to
decide the merits . . . based on failure to comply with the provisions of the Uniform Commer-
[Vol. 27
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directly on point, it is helpful to analogize to similar situations.
In Triangle Underwriters Inc. v. Honeywell Inc.,59 the court
held computer programs to be "goods." 60 The court went on to hold
that "intangibles may be 'goods.' "81 Another court determined that a
contract for compiling, editing and publishing certain pamphlets and
other printed materials amounted to a contract for the sale of
"goods." 6 In the criminal context, one court has held that copies of
copyrighted motion pictures were "goods, wares or merchandise." 8
The court specifically rejected the defendants' argument that "motion
picture photoplays are intangibles and cannot be considered 'goods,
wares or merchandise' under 18 U.S.C. § 2314" which prohibited
interstate transportation of those stolen articles.6 ' Therefore, there is
a strong argument that screenplays are "goods" within the meaning
of the UCC, especially if courts resist the temptation to impose an
artificially distinct category for intellectual property.65
Are the relations between a writer and movie studio or producer
"transactions"? The UCC does not define "transactions," which
have been judicially construed to primarily encompass sales.66 The
writer usually discloses his screenplay idea in soliciting a sale. The
studio or producer's purchase or use of the screenplay is the act nec-
essary to conclude the "transaction. 67 Thus, the writer and studio
cial Code (Sec. 1-206(1))." Id. at 294, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 438. See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra
note 3, § 16.04, at 16-22 (discussing Kurlan, but not stating whether the U.C.C. should
apply).
59. 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 651 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 769. See also RRX Indus, Inc. v. Lab-Con. Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.
1985) (applying California law, the court held that a computer software system was a "good").
61. Triangle Underwriters Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y.
1978).
62. Lake Wales Pub. Co. v. Florida Visitor, Inc., 335 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
63. United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977).
64. Id. at 1332.
65. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1978). UCC's definition of "good," "means all things ...
which are movable at the time of identification." Id. For examples of expansive view of
"goods," see Morauer v. Deak & Co., 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1979)
(foreign coins purchased for investment were "goods"); Trimble v. North Ridge Farms, Inc.,
700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985) (part ownership of a syndicated stallion with the right to breed
was a "good"); Hedges v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, 396 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)
(metered electricity is a "good" although electrical energy is not); Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle
Breeders of Canada, Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corp., 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 292, 590 P.2d 1306 (Wyo.
1979) (holding that the UCC was applicable in an exclusive dealing contract to sell bull semen
for artificial insemination).
66. 1 R. ALDERMAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 3 (1983) [hereinafter 1 R. ALDERMAN]. A transaction in goods may also include "ar-
rangements that are clearly not sales, for example, a lease or a bailment." Id.
67. See infra notes 76-86.
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or producer should be viewed as engaged in sales "transactions."
This is consistent with the policy of the UCC and the Second Re-
statement regarding contract formation.68
A writer's commercial transactions regarding a screenplay
should be directly governed by the UCC. However, even if a court is
unwilling to apply the UCC directly, "arguments by analogy to the
UCC should always be given great weight." 9 The Second Restate-
ment does not have the limitations of applying only to transactions in
goods. The Second Restatement applies to all contracts."0 Thus the
Second Restatement, and its underlying UCC-improved provisions,
should be applied to writer-producer 7 dealings when the subject
matter of the contract involves intellectual property.
C. Contract Formation
Application of the UCC simplifies the evaluation of contract
formation. The UCC does not differentiate between express and im-
plied contracts.7 Instead, the UCC provides that "a contract for sale
of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a contract. ' '7 8 If a producer used a screenwriter's screenplay
and the writer reasonably expected payment, a court should recog-
nize a contract under section 2-204(1).7" This section of the UCC
gives a court greater flexibility to find contracts in writer-producer
relations. 75
68. See infra notes 76-86.
69. 1 R. ALDERMAN, supra note 66, at 4. See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra
note 52, at 17.
70. MURRAY, supra note 53, at § 3; J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 52, at 13.
71. This paper assumes that the defendant is the producer of the alleged infringing
movie. However, the defendant could of course be the movie studio executive, the director or
one of many others.
72. For a similar position in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS see text accom-
panying note 42.
73. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
22(2) (1981) stating, "[a] manifestation of mutual assent may be made even though neither
offer nor acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of formation cannot be
determined." Id. See also id. § 22(2)(b) (assent by course of conduct).
74. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1978) states, "[flormation in General. (1) A contract for sale of
goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." Id.
75. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 362, comment a (1981). Section
362, comment a appears to give great flexibility to the courts by providing:
a. Reason for requirement. One of the fundamental requirements for the en-
forceability of a contract is that its terms be certain enough to provide the basis
for giving an appropriate remedy. [citation omitted]. If this minimum standard
[Vol. 27
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Another UCC simplification allows contract formation even
though a price has not been fixed.7  Also, the UCC establishes that a
buyer "accepts" ' 7 goods by performing any act inconsistent with the
seller's ownership.78 The buyer's acceptance triggers a duty to pay
for the goods. 7
These UCC provisions simplify the writer's task of proving a
contract in the typical misappropriation case. The producer, as
buyer, usually reads the writer's screenplay. This is not just a liter-
ary exercise, but rather a commercial transaction with expectations
on both sides. As is customary in the trade, the writer will be paid if
the producer receives and wishes to use the screenplay. A producer
who uses the screenplay idea without compensating the writer acts
inconsistently with the writer's ownership. Under section 2-
606(1)(c)80 of the UCC, this inconsistent act triggers the producer's
acceptance of the writer's goods. Acceptance of the goods is sufficient
to show agreement under UCC section 2-204(l)." A contract
formed in this way obligates a producer to pay for the "goods" (the
use of the project conveyed in the written submission). The contract
price is a good faith amount fixed by the producer or a reasonable
price as determined by the court.82
of certainty is not met, there is no contract at all. It may be, however, that the
terms are certain enough to provide the basis for the calculation of damages but
not certain enough to permit the court to frame an order of specific performance
or an injunction and to determine whether the resulting performance is in ac-
cord with what has been ordered. In that case there is a contract but it is not
enforceable by specific performance or an injunction.
Id. (emphasis in original).
76. U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(a) (1978). See id. § 2-305(2) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 204 comment d (1981).
77. Acceptance of the goods signifies the buyer's willingness to assume ownership of
those goods. 1 R. ALDERMAN, supra note 66, at 305.
78. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(c) (1978) states: "(1) [A]cceptance of goods occurs when the
buyer . . .(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is wrongful
as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him." Id. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 380(3) comment b which states, "a party may manifest his inten-
tion to affirm by words or other conduct, including the exercise of domiiion over what he has
received in a manner inconsistent with avoidance of the contract." d.
79. 1 R. ALDERMAN, supra note 66, at 303. Cf Chandler v. Roach, 156 Cal. App. 2d
435, 441, 319 P.2d 776, 780 (1957) (stating that "[ilt is reasonably understood that a profes-
sional author expects payment of the reasonable value of the idea or the material, if used, so
that the conduct of the producer in accepting it implies a promise to fulfill those reasonable
expectations." Id.).
80. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(c) (1978) as set forth supra note 78.
81. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) as set forth supra note 74.
82. Under U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1978):
The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the
price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for
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D. Statute of Frauds
A common stumbling block to enforcing a contract is the statute
of frauds. The statute, as set forth in section 2-201 of the UCC,
"requires that contracts for the 'sale of goods for the price of $500 or
more' must satisfy minimal formal requirements before they are en-
forceable." 88 The statute requires "some writing sufficient to indicate
that a contract for sale has been made between the parties." '84 The
screenwriter, whose ideas have been appropriated, may not have a
writing sufficient to satisfy the statute. However, the statute also
states, "a contract which does not satisfy the requirements [of a writ-
ing] but which is valid in other respects is enforceable with respect to
goods . . . which have been received and accepted." 8 Thusr, the pro-
ducer's "acceptance" of the goods, as earlier discussed," operates to
satisfy the statute of frauds, making an oral contract enforceable.
E. Terms of the Contract
When the producer fails to pay the writer for the ideas appro-
priated, the writer usually files suit for breach of contract.8 The
court then determines the contours of the parties' agreement.88 Ac-
cording to the UCC, "agreement" means "the bargain of the parties
in fact as found in their language or by implication from other cir-
cumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price; or (b) the price is left to be agreed by
the parties and they fail to agree.
Id. UCC section 2-305(2) provides: "A price to be fixed by the seller ...means a price for
him to fix in good faith." Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204, com-
ment d (1981), which states that, "where there is a contract ... but nothing is said as to price
the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery." Id.
83. 1 R. ALDERMAN, supra note 66, at 29 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-201). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110(2)(a) (1981), which provides, "(2) The follow-
ing classes of contracts, which were traditionally subject to the Statute of Frauds, are now
governed by Statute of Frauds provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code: (a) a contract for
the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more (U.C.C. § 2-201)." Id.
84. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1978).
85. Id. at § 2-201(3)(c). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 375
(1981), which allows restitution under a contract even though the contract is unenforceable
because of the operation of the statute of frauds. This would appear to ensure the same result
as UCC section 2-201(3)(c).
86. See supra note 80.
87. The writer will of course also allege several other causes of action such as copyright
infringement, unjust enrichment (quasi-contract) and breach of confidence. See supra notes 18-
25 and accompanying text.
88. Here it is assumed that all other requirements for a valid contract have been met by
the methods previously discussed.
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performance. . .. ,"" To determine the terms of the writer and pro-
ducer's agreement, the court looks to express or implied terms and to
trade usage."0 The express incorporation of trade usage into the con-
tract should substantially help a writer in delineating the terms of
this agreement. However, an offer of proof of trade custom was not
allowed into evidence at the trial court level in Davies v. Krasna.",
In Davies, the plaintiff offered proof"2 of a custom in the motion
picture industry whereby, "when stories . . . were submitted to pro-
ducers, there was an understanding . . . that such submission was
for a . . . confidential purpose and that use would not be made
thereof unless there was appropriate payment by the producer."9
Under pre-UCC law, as exemplified by the First Restatement, evi-
dence of this type of trade usage was allowed only if strict standards
were met.94 Under the UCC, in contrast, this evidence of trade cus-
tom would have been admitted pursuant to section 1-205(5). 5 The
UCC recognizes the importance of this evidence in determining the
parties' agreement." The UCC's express mandate allowing trade us-
89. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3
(1981), defining agreement as "a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more
persons," and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(5) (1981), which states,
"[wiherever reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties to a promise or agree-
ment are interpreted as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of perform-
ance, course of dealing, or usage of trade." Id. But cf id. § 1-205(4).
90. 1 R. ALDERMAN, supra note 66, at 56. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 202(5) (1981) (set forth supra note 89).
91. 245 Cal. App. 2d 535, 541, 54 Cal. Rptr. 37, 40 (1966).
92. The offer of proof was made after the court sustained defendant's objection to the
admission of the trade custom evidence. Id.
93. Id.
94. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 247 (1932), provides:
WHEN USAGE IS OPERATIVE UPON PARTIES.
A usage is operative upon parties to a transaction where and only where
(a) they manifest to each other an assent that the usage shall be operative, or (b)
either party intends the effect of his words or other acts to be governed by the
usage, and the other party knows or has reason to know this intention, or (c) the
usage exists in such transactions and each party knows of the usage or it is
generally known by persons under similar circumstances, unless either party
knows or has reason to know that the other party has an intention inconsistent
with the usage.
Id.
95. U.C.C. § 1-205(5) (1978) provides, "[a]n applicable usage of trade in the place
where any part of performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to
that part of the performance." Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(3)
(1981), which states, "[u]nless otherwise agreed, a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in
which the parties are engaged or a usage of trade of which they know or have reason to know
gives meaning to or supplements or qualifies their agreement." Id.
96. Cf McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (an idea misappro-
priation case in which the court did not cite to the Code, but did state that, "[ain implied-in-
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age evidence would help the screenwriter prove the existence of an
agreement with a producer.
F. Release Forms
When the writer proves a contract to the court's satisfaction, the
producer can raise a potent affirmative defense predicated on a com-
monly used release form. The release form is a tool employed by
producers and signed by the writer prior to screenplay submission."'
The form waives the writer's right to sue the producer.98 The stan-
dard form states, "I will not assert against you . . . any claim based
on plagiarism, infringement, confidential relationship, implied con-
tract, unfair competition or otherwise arising out of any alleged use
by you of [my screenplay]. '"" The same release then states, "not-
withstanding my release . . . in the event a court . . . shall find that
you have wrongfully appropriated [my screenplay] from me and that
the [screenplay] is original with me . . . then I will suffer no dam-
ages in excess of $1000."' l° In apparent overkill, this particular re-
lease limits the writer in two respects: (1) the writer releases his
right to sue; and (2) if the writer brings suit, his damages are limited
to $1000. Thus, the release form is a powerful tool in the producer's
hands.
fact contract may be based upon industry custom or usage regarding submission and use of
ideas."). Id.
97. See supra note 32. For examples of earlier release forms see Olsson, Dreams for
Sale, 23 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 34, 56-58 (1958).
98. See Note, supra note 32, at 102.
99. Section three of a Standard Release form [hereinafter Standard Release] the relevant
sections are set forth below.
I hereby acknowledge the following understandings and conditions:
I. My submission of the Project to you is voluntary, not solicited by you, and
not in confidence. There are no materials being submitted to you other than
those described in the summary of the Project at the end of this letter.
2. There is no agreement between us, express or implied, relating to your use
or failure to use the Project.
3. I will not assert against you, your affiliates, subsidiaries, licensees, assigns,
officers, agents or employees any claim based on plagiarism, infringement, confi-
dential relationship, implied contract, unfair competition or otherwise arising
out of any alleged use by your of the Project.
4. If, notwithstanding my release contained above, I should hereafter claim
that you have used the Project, or any portion thereof, without my consent or
authorization, I specifically agree and understand that I will suffer no damages
in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) and that such damages up to
said limit shall be my sole remedy and shall be payable only in the event a court
of competent jurisdiction shall find that you have wrongfully appropriated the
Project from me and that the Project is original with me.
100. Id. at § 4.
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The validity of releases has been questioned by commenta-
tors,'01 but the continued use of the release forms evidences their
value to producers. The screenwriter may employ three legal theo-
ries, including contract interpretation, public policy and unconscio-
nability to circumvent the effect of release forms.
1. Contract Interpretation
Courts have used contract interpretation as a means to circum-
vent the effects of any undesirable waiver clause.'0 2 For example, the
recent case of Burten v. Milton Bradley'03 dealt specifically with a
release form in an idea disclosure situation. In Burten, the plaintiffs
wished to sell a game to the defendant game company.' 4 As a pre-
requisite to submittal, the plaintiffs signed a release form.' 5 The
defendant then rejected plaintiffs' game.' 08 Approximately one year
later, the defendant introduced a game which was remarkably simi-
lar to the plaintiffs'.' The case was submitted to the jury, which
returned a verdict of over $700,000 for the plaintiffs.0 8 The district
court stated that "the jury could well have inferred ... that [de-
fendant] plagiarized the plaintiffs' idea without so much as a by-
your-leave."' 0 9 The district court granted defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiffs had
signed what appeared to be an iron clad release form."0
The circuit court found the release form ambiguous and re-
versed the district court."' The court stated, "We do not dispute
Milton Bradley's assertion that its form may credibly be read to
waive all relationships and obligations between the parties, including
a confidential relationship.""' 2 However, "the agreement .. .does
not adequately apprise them of the rights and obligations of the par-
ties upon Milton Bradley's affirmative use or appropriation of the
101. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 16.05(D), at 16-38, 39; Note, supra note 32, at
102.
102. S. DEUTCH, UNFAIR CONTRACTS § 1.3 (1977).
103. 763 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1985).
104. Id. at 462.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 467.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 465.
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ideas submitted.""'  Thus, the court seemed to admit that the release
could be interpreted as a complete waiver and yet inadequacies in
the release were still found. The court indicated its disfavor with the
release form when it stated: "We are hard pressed to understand
why experienced and informed inventors would submit their ideas
for consideration and thereby waive all rights to compensation for
their labor.""" Burten illustrates a willingness to use contract inter-
pretation as a means of avoiding the seemingly inequitable result of
enforcing a one-sided release form." 5
A court reviewing the standard release" 6 could use an analysis
similar to that in Burten. The clause, stating that "[tlhere is no
agreement between us, express or implied relating to your use or
failure to use the [screenplay]," ' could be interpreted to relate only
to the time of submission of the screenplay. Thus, if a producer mis-
appropriated the idea of a screenplay after submission, the exculpa-
tory clause could be interpreted as inapplicable. Similarly, the
clause, stating that "I will not. assert against you . . . any claim
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The relevant sections of the release form are set forth below:
DISCLOSURE RECORD
Milton Bradley Company, Divisions and Subsidiaries
Gentlemen:
I wish to submit for your consideration, subject to all of the conditions below, the idea or
item hereinafter described. I am the sole and exclusive owner (or authorized representative of
, the owner) of said item or idea and am of legal age and free to make agree-
ments relative to this idea or item.
Description of My Idea or Item
(Use attachments if necessary for fuller description. Accompany by photo or drawing. If your
item or idea is patented, you may furnish us a copy of the patent since it defines your rights in
the subject matter thereof.)
I submit my idea or item voluntarily and I understand that this submission by me and its
acceptance by Company does not, in whole or in part, establish or create by implication or
otherwise any relationship between Company and me not expressed herein. I further under-
stand and agree that Company, in its own judgment, may accept or reject the idea or item
submitted and shall not obligated to me in any way with respect to my idea or item until
Company shall at its own election enter into a properly executed written agreement with me
and then only, according to all of the terms of said agreement. If no agreement is concluded, I
shall rely solely upon such rights as I may have under U.S. Patent laws.
I agree that Company may consider this idea or item within a reasonable time.
I further agree the Company may photograph, xerograph or otherwise reproduce for its
records only any material submitted by me herewith or subsequently with respect to said idea
or item whether accepted or rejected.
Date of Submission _ Signature
Taken from the lower court's opinion. Burten, 592 F. Supp. at 1021.
116. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
117. See Standard Release, supra note 99.
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based on plagiarism, infringement, . . . implied contract ... or oth-
erwise arising out of any alleged use by you of the [screenplay],"'18
could be interpreted as applying only if no subsequent conduct on
the producer's part makes the claims relevant. This judicial word
twisting could be conducted on each clause of the contract in order
for the court to avoid an inequitable result.
An application of the UCC to these contracts would grant a
court wide latitude in interpreting contracts because of the express
recognition of the importance of trade usage." 9 Under UCC section
2-202(a), trade usage may be used to explain or supplement a con-
tract. 20 The screenwriter could show the trade usage that when
screenplays are submitted, no use will be made of them unless ap-
propriate payment is made.' This trade usage could then be used
to reinterpret the clause, "there is no agreement between us" '22 into
a more equitable contract term. However, in the commercial context
of screenplay submissions, reliance on ad hoc interpretations, such as
those used by the Burten court, or as an application of the UCC
would allow, are insufficient to consistently protect the screenwriter.
2. As Against Public Policy
Thousands of contracts have been invalidated for violating pub-
lic policy.' 2 ' Indeed, the Second Restatement explicitly recognizes
that a contract may be made unenforceable because of underlying
public policy. 24 This doctrine appears to help the screenwriter who
has previously signed a release form but is suing a producer on a
breach of contract theory. The writer could argue that the release
118. Id.
119. U.C.C. § 1-205(5) (1978).
120. U.C.C. § 2-202 provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree
or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contempora-
neous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of per-
formance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing
to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement.
Id.
121. See supra notes 89-96.
122. See Standard Release, supra note 99.
123. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1375 (1964 & Supp. 1984). See also S.
DEUTCH, supra note 102, at § 1.3.
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981); see infra note 131.
1.9871
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form contract is unenforceable as a matter of public policy."2 5 The
writer could show evidence of public policy by reference to legisla-
tion or judicial decisions which appear contrary to enforcement of
the disputed contract term.'2 6 Also, the writer could point out any
misconduct that has occurred which appears connected with the ex-
culpatory clause.12 A court could then use this evidence to declare a
contract term unenforceable. 28 Under this theory, a screenwriter can
circumvent a release form with a public policy argument.
Unfortunately, public policy arguments are inherently uncer-
tain. As Professor Corbin states, "A decision or a rule that is be-
lieved to be in accord with the general welfare today may not accord
with it tomorrow."'1 29 This results from the focus of the public policy
argument on general public welfare. The validity of the release form
may actually be in furtherance of the general public's welfare and
yet be devastating to the screenwriter. Also, even if the public's wel-
fare coincides with the screenwriter's, the voiding of a contract
through public policy is only to be applied infrequently.'" The court
must first consider the public's interest in freedom of contracting,
and then declare the contract unenforceable, only if the public inter-
est is clearly outweighed by public policy against its enforcement.'
125. In the Matter of the Arbitration between Cayuga Prods., Inc. and Clyde Ware,
Cal. Superior Court No. 820062 (1963). Found in M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 16.05(D), at
16-38.
126. See infra note 31 for the text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
178(3).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. CORBIN, supra note 123, § 1375, at 12.
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 comments b & c (1981).
131. RES'rATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981) provides:
When a term is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against the enforcement of such terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken of
(a) the parties' justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken
of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial
decision,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it
was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term.
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Therefore, although a public policy argument may occasionally
protect the screenwriter, its inherent focus on the general public's
welfare lessens its effectiveness. Consequently, the screenwriter needs
a more consistent and commercially reasonable doctrine to combat
the effect of the standard release form.
3. Unconscionability
Section 2-302, which was designed to permit courts to police
contracts against abuse,1"2 is one of the most controversial"' sections
of article 2. That section provides, "[i]f the court as a matter of law
finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been uncon-
scionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause .. , 4 No definition of unconscionable
is given, but the "test is whether, in the light of the general commer-
cial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconsciona-
ble. . ,,."" The Second Restatement has adopted a section virtu-
ally identical to the UCC's unconscionability section."' Thus, in
UCC or non-UCC contexts, the contractual dealings between screen-
writer and producer must not be unconscionable.
Section 2-302 provides the screenwriter with a solution to inval-
idate the one-sided release form. Under this section, the release form
should be evaluated in light of the general commercial needs of the
Id.
132. 1 R. ALDERMAN, supra note 66, at 60-61. See also U.C.C. § 2-302 comment (1)
(1978).
133. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. PIr. L. REV. 349 (1970).
134. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978). However, section 2-302 has not been enacted in three
states (including California). WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 44, at 149. (However, Califor-
nia did adopt the full text and official comments to UCC section 2-302 in Civil Code section
1670.5. "The only significant difference is that § 1670.5 . . . applies to all contracts rather
than being limited to those sales transactions governed by the Commercial Code." A & M
Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 485, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121 (1982)).
Also, the Second Restatement's similar provision (section 208) should apply to all states. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS section 208 (1981) provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id.
135. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment (1) (1978).
136. See supra note 134 for the text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208
(1981).
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trade."8  Although producers in the movie industry need protection
against nonmeritorious claims, a broad, one-sided release form
should not be allowed to serve this purpose. For example, the stan-
dard release states that "I will not assert against you . . . any claim
based on plagiarism, infringement, confidential relationship, implied
contract, unfair competition or otherwise. . .. ""' This clause, if
given its stated effect, would allow a producer to misappropriate a
writer's screenplay and legally avoid accountability. Another section
of the standard release limits the remedy for misappropriation to
$1,000."' Both of these clauses are an incentive for misappropria-
tion on the producer's part since they allow a producer to steal a
screenplay for $1,000 or less. These clauses apparently meet the
standard of being "so one-sided as to be unconscionable" 1 0 and thus,
under the UCC's, unconscionability policing section, should not be
given effect.
An express term usually overrides any course of performance.""
However, some cases have allowed this usual system of priority to be
reversed, 4" which is consistent with other sections of the UCC."3
The courts therefore recognize that the terms of a contract, such as a
release form, are not necessarily controlling. Thus, if a producer in-
troduces a signed release form as a defense in a screenwriter-pro-
ducer appropriation suit, the writer has several arguments. The
writer can argue that the terms of the release form should be avoided
through contract interpretation.' The writer can claim that the re-
lease is void as against public policy." Finally, the writer can argue
that the release form is unconscionable as a matter of law.
G. Remedies
A detailed analysis of remedies in the typical screenwriter mis-
alpropriation lawsuit is outside the scope of this paper. However, a
brief overview is appropriate. The three remedies usually available
137. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment (1) (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, § 208 comment (a) (determination to be made "in the light of its setting, purpose and
effect"). Id.
138. See Standard Release, supra note 99.
139. Id.
140. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment (1) (1978).
141. U.C.C. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
203(b) (1981).
142. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 52, at 129-31 nn.87 & 97.
143. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-204(1), 2-207(3), 2-606(I)(c) (1978).
144. See supra notes 102-22.
145. See supra notes 123-31.
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in contract law are expectancy, reliance and restitution damages."'
The UCC does not refer to its remedies in these terms. Instead, sec-
tion 2-703 simply lists all the remedy options available to an "ag-
grieved seller.1147 These remedies are to be "liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed. '148
Of the many UCC remedies, an action for the price would be
appropriate for the screenwriter.149 Section 2-709 provides that
"when the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller
may recover . . . the price of goods accepted." 50 Under this section,
the screenwriter would then be able to recover the "price" of the
screenplay from the producer. The only difficulty would be in deter-
mining the "price." A court should calculate the price based upon
the amount the producer should have paid for the screenplay at ac-
ceptance."' This amount could be determined from any course of
dealing, course of performance or trade usage.'52 These damages
may be an approximation, but the UCC recognizes that "compensa-
tory damages are often at best approximate: they have to be proved
with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no
more."' Also, under section 2-709, the screenwriter would be enti-
146. R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 138 (1970).
147. U.C.C. § 2-703 (1978) provides:
Seller's Remedies in General
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to
make a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with respect to a part
or the whole, then with respect to any goods directly affected and, if the breach
is of the whole contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole
undelivered balance, the aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided (Section 2-705);
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still unidentified to the
contract;
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter provided (Section 2-706);
(e) recover damages for non-acceptance (Section 2-708) or in a proper case the
price (Section 2-709);
(0 cancel.
Id.
148. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978).
149. See 1 R. ALDERMAN, supra note 66, § 1.78-10, at 413, which states: "the most
obvious case in which the seller should have the right to collect the price of the goods from the
buyer is when the buyer 'accepts' the goods and then refuses to pay for them." Id.
150. U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(a) (1978).
151. See supra note 79.
152. See supra notes 89-96 (discussing the incorporation of course of dealing, course of
performance and trade usage into the parties' agreement).
153. U.C.C. § 1-106 comment 1 (1978).
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tied to any incidental damages."5 4 Incidental damages would include
all "commercially reasonable expenditures made by the seller."' 5
V. THE "NEW" AND APPROPRIATE CONTRACT ANALYSIS
The UCC was enacted to bring clarity, consistency and reason-
ableness to the law of contracts. 5 Its doctrines apply to the
problems of screenwriters either directly or by analogy. Even if the
UCC is not applied, a court should still adopt the UCC's underlying
principles through reliance on the Second Restatement. The UCC's
ease of contract formation, incorporation of trade usage, specific
adoption of unconscionability, and liberality of remedies all would
further the protection of screenwriters from unlawful appropriation
of their ideas.
The UCC provides a means of consistently protecting screen-
writers from screenplay misappropriation. This modern contract
protection would not deprive the public of a free flow of ideas since
it would only operate in connection with an individual writer and
producer. Also, the UCC would eliminate an embarrassing abuse of
bargaining power from the motion picture industry. Ultimately, im-
plementation of the UCC in writer-producer relations would en-
courage creation and dissemination of new ideas, which would in
turn lead to the growth and prosperity of the industry.
154. Id. at § 2-709(l).
155. Id. at § 2-710.
156. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 44, at 15.
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